Interested in the intersections between policy, law and technology. Programmer, lawyer, civil servant, orthodox Marxist. Blind.


Interesado en la intersección entre la política, el derecho y la tecnología. Programador, abogado, funcionario, marxista ortodoxo. Ciego.

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Cake day: June 5th, 2023

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  • To look at this issue we have to consider what Popper was trying to do with falsificationism, and the current of thought he was embedded in (logical positivism). The reason of being of a notion like falsificationism is the so-called problem of demarcation: i.e., how can we distinguish science from non-science? And, even more particularly, how can we distinguish science from science-looking or science-claiming things (pseudoscience)?

    Falsificationism has the virtue of giving a simple answer to the problem of demarcation. Science happens when theory offers hypotheses that can be subjected to empirical tests, and, upon disconfirming data, the hypotheses are abandoned. The problem is, this is not how science works, but also, this is not how science ought to work.

    An example: Newtonian physics. This is an especially good example, because the Vienna Circle were clear that, if there was something worth being called science, it was physics. So, a demarcation criterion that tells us Newtonian mechanics is pseudoscience is very much off.

    Welcome to stellar parallax. Parallax is the apparently shift of position of an object (in this case a star) because of the movement of the observer (in this case, Earth). Newtonian mechanics and the heliocentric model predicted stellar parallax, but until the 1830s it had been impossible to detect:

    Stellar parallax is so small that it was unobservable until the 19th century, and its apparent absence was used as a scientific argument against heliocentrism during the early modern age. It is clear from Euclid’s geometry that the effect would be undetectable if the stars were far enough away, but for various reasons, such gigantic distances involved seemed entirely implausible: it was one of Tycho Brahe’s principal objections to Copernican heliocentrism that for it to be compatible with the lack of observable stellar parallax, there would have to be an enormous and unlikely void between the orbit of Saturn and the eighth sphere (the fixed stars).

    So here we have a hypothesis: stars will appear to shift due to the movement of the Earth. We have an observation, in fact lots of observations through about two centuries: stars appear fixed. And yet neither the Copernican hypothesis nor Newtonian mechanics were abandoned (nor should they have been!).

    So does that mean science should be immune to disconfirmation? Don’t we learn anything from data? Obviously not. But we need a bit more of a sophisticated view than falsificationism. A clue is given us in Quine’s essay, Two dogmas of empiricism. In this essay, Quine points out that when we speak of confirmation (this was earlier than the notion of falsification) we shouldn’t so much think of a given predicate or hypothesis, but to the whole system (this is what’s usually called, for this reason, confirmation holism).

    The point here is, a single datum shouldn’t make us throw away an entire theory that is otherwise predicting a lot of other data. In fact, a priori, we don’t know necessarily what’s going on. The parallax of stars wasn’t observed because stars were a lot further away than it was commonly believed, but the instruments, experimental technique and grounding theory were broadly correct.

    Both general mechanics and quantum mechanics are just as false as Newtonian mechanics, in a certain sense. QM fails to predict gravitational lensing, and GR fails to predict interference patterns in the double slit experiment.

    Yet we don’t throw them away, wisely.

    Sometimes when we have a very strong theory and a datum that contradicts it, what we should do is throw it away. Example: if we get measurements that suggest speeds greater than light, we’re probably having measurement error somewhere.

    It’s better to look at this issue through the lens of Lakatos’ notion of a research programme, that has certain core commitments, and auxiliary or compensatory hypotheses. In Lakatos’ terms, a programme is productive if it still makes non-trivial, novel predictions, and becomes degenerate if the auxiliary hypotheses grow too numerous and difficult to sustain, on the face of new data.

    All models are (probably) wrong, but some are more useful than others. Science requires us to consider whether our theory generates accurate predictions in advance, without having to create endless numbers of special cases every time we make new observations. If several theories exist, they probably all have holes, and should be judged in terms of whether they are still useful to predict and understand new things.



  • Not that I expect a lot of consistency from imperialists, but essentially the same lines of argument can be used regarding the Russian Federation.

    An advisory opinion would effectively settle Israel’s “bilateral dispute” without the state’s consent.

    Ditto for .ru and .ua.

    The court is not equipped to examine a “broad range of complex factual issues concerning the entire history of the parties’ dispute”.

    Same thing, especially if we get back to the formation of the Soviet Union, independence referenda, and so on.

    An advisory opinion would conflict with existing agreements between the parties and negotiation frameworks endorsed by the UN.

    This would be Minsk I and II.

    The request is not appropriate as it asks the court to “assume unlawful conduct on the part of Israel”.

    Ditto.


  • The biggest issues for me are:

    1. No centralisation means there’s no canonical single source of truth.
    2. Account migration.
    3. Implementation compatibility.

    No single source of truth leads to the weird effect that if you check a post on your instance, it will have different replies from those on a different instance. Only the original instance where it got posted will have a complete reply set–and only if there are no suspensions involved. Some of this is fixable in principle, but there are technical obstacles.

    Account migration is possible, but migration of posts and follows is non-trivial, Also migration between different implementations is usually not possible. Would be nice if people could keep a distinction between their instance, and their identity, so that the identity could refer to their own domain, for example.

    Last, the issue with implementation compatibility. Ideally it should be possible to use the same account to access different services, and to some extent it works (mastodon can post replies to lemmy or upvote, but not downvote, for example).


  • Historically many if not most conflicts started with the breach of an agreement. Without getting bogged down in irrelevant detail, there are issue of self-determination of Crimea, which repeatedly in 3 referenda (2 if you wish to exclude the last one) pronounced in favour of either autonomy or being part of the CIS (effectively Russian Federation). Likewise, and setting aside the 2014 events for the moment, there also were agreements that, in principle, may have served as a valid status quo, such as Minsk II, and were not complied to by the parties.

    So, sure, some form of trust-building will be necessary. But what’s the alternative? Endless war?



  • No such implication is there. All I said was serious negotiations, which given the state of facts entails the prospect of territorial concessions. I don’t expect the negotiations would lead to a simple redrawing of the borders to take account of what each side materially holds at present. In fact, I don’t have much of a preconceived idea of what such negotiations would be like other than I find it extremely unlikely that Crimea will return to Ukrainian control. That’s the point of negotiation: finding out what the belligerents can live with.